Authors: Serena Giusti and Tomislava Penkova
Russian foreign policy is driven by national interests; pragmatism has replaced ideology. Russia seems to act according to generally predictable and comprehensible rules and principles. Therefore the country should not be seen as an exception but rather as a normal power and – in due course – a normal great power.
In recent years, Russia has developed a more mercantilist rather than imperialist posture towards international politics. However, the West keeps a conservative mindset in dealing with Moscow. In particular, the West tends to look at the way Russia interacts with other major international actors through the lenses of the Cold-War. This way of thinking strengthens old lines of division rather than providing new opportunities of cooperation.
Russia overplaying its energy card has been (mis)interpreted as neo-imperial ambitions rather than a predictable and rational policy meant to establish a more equitable system of international relations.
So if the West considers Russia as an antagonistic power, it will fail not only to build up cooperative relations but also will lose the chance to have Russia on its side in dealing with troubled areas such as the Middle East or Central Asia or with troublesome countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea and Syria. Furthermore, Russia is well poised for facing crucial questions such as terrorism, pollution, high prices of commodities, energy supplies. The West-Russia relationship is definitely not a zero sum game as in the past.
The confusion surrounding the adoption of the Lisbon reform Treaty will not help Russia to understand and deal with the EU. For Russia it is harder to deal/negotiate with the West than vice-versa.
Furthermore, the West tends to look at the way Russia interacts with the major international actors through the lenses of the Cold-War. This way of thinking continues to maintain lines of division rather than offering fresh opportunities of cooperation.
Moscow instead seems more emancipated from the legacy of the past and inspired by pragmatism based on realpolitik. Russia also wants to define its relations with the West
in a completely new atmosphere. It can be argued that the West is still victim of “ideology” and
history while Russia is mostly driven by a realistic approach towards politics.
Cooling relations with the EU depends on the very nature of the process of European
integration more than on increasing competing interests.
. In this perspective, Russia’s alleged “divide et impera” European strategy would simply reflect the idea that in Europe sovereign nation-states still count. It is then easier and more profitable to do business with individual EU member states than with the EU as such. The EU unity is in fact weak, reflecting diverse levels of energy dependency and historical memories and experiences with Russia.
In addition, the EU and Russia interpret history and memory differently. The Russian elite tends to emphasize a prestigious national history rather than reconsider accepted interpretations of the past. In contrast, Europeans give primacy to the devoir de
mémoire on which the whole process of European integration is based (reconciliation).
The EU-Russia relationship also suffers from an excess of institutionalism. Paradoxically, the institutionalization of the relationship has not institutionalized confidence between the partners”
Once again, the EU capacity to build up sophisticated frameworks for dealing with the outside areas/countries might be a way for dissimulating contrasts or not confronting real
issues.
The EU is perceived as highly fragmented, Izvestia (September 1, 2008), for instance, published a map of EU states divided into four categories: “virulent critics”: Baltic states, Britain, Poland, Sweden; “moderate critics”: Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania; “centrists”: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Slovakia; “Moscow lobbyists”: Belgium, Cyprus, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Greece, Italy.
In various and uneven ways the West tried to devise strategies to make integration possible, but always accompanied by conditionality features designed for countries in the process of accession to western institutions, which ultimately proved counterproductive in Russia’s case. The most striking example is the EU-Russia relationship. Brussels seeks to impose certain conditions on Russian political, economic and social development, as it does in the case of EU candidate members.
This tactic however proves to be inadequate for Russia since it cannot be equalled to
such states. Russia has and deserves a different role in world politics. Exerting excessive pressure on its domestic politics results in encouraging anti-Western nationalist forces. The conditionality approach towards Russia means explicitly diminishing its role and force on the international arena and rejecting its contribution and worthiness in shaping the international political landscape. The West should stop being paternalistic towards Moscow and acknowledge its revival. On the contrary, Russia is ready to comply with the rules of those organizations, such as WTO and OECD, where it can enjoy an equal status and the rewards are particularly palatable.
Western analysts persist in viewing Russia and its external choices as highly subjective. Russia is often treated as a special case. We believe that the most suitable way to consider Russia’s foreign policy is rather to recognize it as a “normal” country in the sense that it acts according to generally predictable and comprehensible rules and principles. Further seeing Russia as an exception would be misleading. The West has tended to interpret Russian actions as excessive or arrogant, while they have often been a normal, measured response to the penetration of the US and the EU in regions traditionally considered Russia’s sphere or to hostile decisions .
The West needs to overcome its deeply held suspicions of Moscow and the bitter memories of the past. This does not mean being lenient towards Russia but rather realistic. An erroneous diagnosis leads to a wrong prognosis and finally to a failing strategy. So, if the West continues to see Russia as an antagonistic power it will fail to build up cooperative relations. Not only, the West would gain from having Russia on its side when dealing with troubled areas such as the Middle East or Central Asia or when facing crucial questions such as terrorism, pollution, rising prices, energy supply.
The way Russian behaviour in foreign policy is understood by the other actors is relevant in designing the right strategy to deal with it. If the West still believes that Russia’s main goal is to become an imperialistic power again, then the right policy would be that of containment.
However, the West should keep in mind that Russia’s abandonment of its empire was mainly peaceful and that the desire to maintain a certain influence on its former republics does not necessarily mean a desire to rebuild an empire. Because Russia overplayed its energy card, this was largely misinterpreted as the neo-imperial ambitions of the Kremlin, and not as a natural and logical policy meant to set up an equitable system of international relations. Russia is not a neo-imperial power but a post-imperial country in search of a new international identity.
The risk is also high to apply the same western developed categories in forecasting future Russian moves especially in relation to an alleged more cooperative approach.
Those who apply theories of democratic transition to Russian foreign policy expect that
democratic consolidation, market economy, civil society activation would lead to a more
accommodating posture.
We argue instead that Russian foreign policy is not conceived as a systemic factor for
internal consensus. As mentioned above, Russia could only play again as a great power after re-emerging from the deep crisis of the 90’s. The country’s external dimension did not help cure the internal catastrophe. Assertiveness in foreign policy helps cement national identity and patriotism but is not a reliable means for nourishing internal legitimacy
Contemporary Russian foreign policy has been determined by both history (self-image as a great power) and a sense of frustration the country suffered after the implosion of the Soviet system that was also accompanied by a deep economic slump.
Russia seems willing to become a world model of hyper-modernization, and so a great
power.
Secondly, Russia has developed a global approach towards economics. As E.B. Rumer stresses “Russia is re-emerging on the world economic stage guided by a mercantilist vision founded on its material wealth, a geographic position that gives it control of important trade routes, and the fact that most of its neighbours need the resources Russia either owns or controls”
Russia aspires to shape a grand strategy moving beyond pragmatism and to become a
multi-dimensional global power acting in different geostrategic theatres
The EU seems more focused on certain areas or concerned with specific issues, and is divided over salient issues of foreign policy including common positions towards Russia. This depends on the fact that the EU is not a Super-state but a post-modern entity dominated by nation states and that it has a typically regional vocation.
Russia has the potential to be one of the world’s most powerful economies in the next 7-20 years
Russia’s international behaviour is to a great extent conditioned by its economic interests and rising might.
A re-launch of the currently suspended talks between Moscow and Brussels on a new partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) could be the framework within which to initiate a constructive dialogue over the region.
Overall, it seems that today Russia is well aware of its interests in the post-Soviet space and is seeking to implement a new course towards those states. The Kremlin stresses that it is not a matter of re-establishing the Russian empire, but simply of preserving legitimate strategic interests. “Russia cannot be denied its own political, military and economic interests there, and its policy can be an effort to preserve existing influence in the region for the purpose of its greater stabilization, rather than imperial control”
It is not unusual to hear from Western analysts that, given Moscow’s inability to alter
the political courses embarked on in former Soviet Republics, it is exploiting its growing
economic (energy) power to regain its previous control. Similar statements, however,
do not correspond to the entire truth.
Conclusions and policy recommendations for Russia and the West
• “As with many other nations, ‘the sources of Russian conduct toward the outside world encompass multiple, interconnected continuities and differences, dynamic along with (relatively) static features. Notions of identity, orientation and “destiny” are conditioned by long-term realities such as geographical location, historical insecurities, and strategic culture, but they also evolve (or become “modernized”) in response to changing requirements and conditions, internal as well as external”
• The West needs to come to terms with the fact that Russia has deeply changed. The new resurgent Russia is not planning to be a threat to the West but primarily to improve its domestic situation by assuring economic growth. To become a post-modern great power it is necessary to consolidate as an economic power. In recent years, Russia has developed a more mercantilist rather than imperialist posture towards international politics.
• The West keeps a conservative mindset in dealing with Moscow and tends to interpret its foreign policy through the old Cold-War antagonist scheme. The West is thus conservative and a victim of history. Russia has been forced to look forward and to rebuild its international position almost from scratch.
• As Gvosdev put it, “To get Russia right, we must seek to understand it as it understands itself, not as we might wish it to be”
. Russia should not be seen as a menace that needs to be contained but rather as a partner to be engaged.
• What are the chances of transforming coercive diplomacy into cooperative diplomacy? This primarily depends on the West’s capacity of understanding Russia, whose assertiveness is often misperceived. It is generally considered the fruit of an antagonist and hostile posture while it is rather the outcome of a more solid position conquered from the late 1990s. The first post-Soviet foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, had already announced that Russia was about to turn
into a “normal great power”
• The West should accept the relativism of the concept of democracy. This does not mean being accommodating with all the consequences of the concept of “sovereign democracy” but accepting that democracy consolidation has different timings and patterns of implementation. As Rumer points out, “Perhaps the most important thing for Western policy on Russian domestic affairs is the necessity of taking the long view, of fully internalizing the idea that change in Russia will take generations”
• Russia does not accept any Western intrusion in its domestic politics and condemns the same in its former Republics. To a larger extent sovereignty implies also that Russia wants to be treated as an equal partner and to set a partnership on the Kremlin’s terms. As Trenin explains these terms are: “accept us as we are, without meddling in our internal affairs; treat us as equals; we will do business where our interests meet, but when differences arise, only
compromise solutions are acceptable. We won’t follow your lead”
. This is about using coercive diplomacy for ensuring the “right terms for cooperation”
• The EU seems to overlook Russia’s economic potential and tends to focus on its presumed democratic regression. This approach might be fallacious and risks undermining the EU approach towards Russia.
• Russia does not appear as a declining power enjoying a temporary revival but rather as a rising power trying to consolidate its position by broadening its portfolio of friends, power resources, means of influence.
• Russia’s overplaying its energy card has been misunderstood as neo-imperial ambitions rather than a predictable and rational policy meant to establish a more equitable system of international relations. In some cases what is considered a political blackmail responds instead to an economic logic (raising oil and gas prices to a market level).
As a result, Russia will converge towards the Western system making dialogue easier.
• Nevertheless, the West should be aware of Russia’s tactical use of inclusive multilateralism (the primacy of the UN, democratization of IR, a new just world order).
• Russia has exhibited an innovative and creative foreign policy. Two factors have contributed to it: Russia is less “ideologized” than the West (it does not demand that others be democracies); it can count on oil and gas for increasing its leverage. In this way Russia has reached out to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, all ruled by conservative regimes that the Soviet Union had either ignored or considered as adversaries. This obviously qualifies Russia for US and EU engagement.
• In general, with energy issues dominating Moscow’s international agenda, at a time when resorting to military power can be too costly and unsuccessful, Russia is a palatable partner, equipped with soft means, with whom to share responsibilities in unstable world regions.
Russia, and the EU
• Since the USSR’s disintegration, Russia has not acted like a client state, a reliable ally, or a true friend, but nor has it behaved like an enemy, much less an enemy with imperialistic ambitions led by a hostile ideology.
• Russia is presenting itself as a mediator in world crises. After the end of the ideologization of the IS, Russia can be a mediator of different civilizations and a bridge between the West and the rest of the world. The pro-Kremlin analyst Vladimir Frolov underlines that “A consensus has formed in Russia to the effect that Russia can’t be integrated into Western structures. And there is no opening for us to be integrated into the East. This means that Russia is destined to
remain an independent centre of power, whether or not it wants to. It will have to rely on its own code of civilization, doing its best to establish equally distant or equally close relations with other centres of power”
• The West should watch out for Russia’s ability to fill a vacuum. The EU would also be suited for competing or cooperating with Russia in many strategic areas. This is the reason why once more Russia should be considered as an opportunity rather than a threat. The revival of the Russian backed ‘geopolitical triangle’ of Russia, the EU and the United States might be useful for managing world developments.
• The EU should reconsider its institutionalism while confronting Russia with more realism in terms of objectives, opportunities and means.
• The West needs to be clearer when talking to Russia. To this effect, the EU, in particular, needs to come out with a truly uniform strategy overcoming internal divisions. Russia has difficulty dealing with a fragmented actor such as the EU.
Russia’s preference for bilateralism does not simply respond to a “divide et impera’’ principle but it is also due to the EU’s lack of a common vision in its external relations
. Furthermore, Russia does not trust a post-modern political construction such as the EU, preferring bilateralism in its relations with the EU members.
• Russia is reluctant to comply with EU requests because they are against the country’s strategic interests (refusal to sign the Energy Charter Treaty).
The EU is not in the position to exert conditionality on Russia since membership is not at stake. Because of its energy dependency the EU has not a strong bargaining power. In addition, Russia in the long run is likely to find alternative markets and partners.
• If the EU wants Russia to become a friendly neighbour, it should abandon an “orthodox” approach in favour of a cooperative attitude. As in the past, Brussels should follow a functionalist approach: focusing on low politics specific issues. A holistic approach, demanding that Russia review its domestic orientations while renouncing its global goals, should be avoided.
• The best the EU can do is to favour Russian convergence in many policy area issues. This would de-politicize their tense relations while favouring growing similarities. Legislative approximation can contribute to open up Russia, to improve governance and ultimately to erode statism and all its implications.
We believe that isolating Moscow can be dangerous for the reactions it might produce and because the West needs Russia on many fronts.
Looking at Russia with a Cold-War mindset does not help develop a civil society with
well-informed opinions, on the contrary nationalism might be revitalized. In this sense
too, Europe has proved a weak and divided actor. The pro-Americanism of some EU
member states prevents the EU from playing an independent role in the reshaping of
pan-European security, including smoothing tensions with Moscow. We recommend a
twin-track approach: showing unity when demanding respect for the rules and a skilful
engaging strategy. Europe has no great leverage but it can certainly profit from partnership with Russia.
