Tuesday, June 30, 2009

RUSSIA : THE CENTRE OF EURASIA

National identity is part of a nation's collective unconscious. It is based partly on memory and it informs a nation about who and where it i, where to go and how it perceives the best routes to get there. National identity influences the way Russia's interests are conceived and pursued.

For Russia the myth of greatness is a profound part of historical precedent, civilizational contribution or geopolitical structure and it seeks reognition on the world stage. Russian mentality is a great power mentality.

Russia sees itself as the natural centre of a new continental bloc (Eurasia) with its own unique, socio-political and spiritual values. The Eurasian connection allows Russia to fulfill its role as a conciliator, as a connecting country, as a country that is working for an interplay of different principles.

Eurasia's heartland is made up of the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). From the heartland Russia is intent on developing strategic alliances with China, India, Japan, Korea and the Middle East Region. It is also interested in cooperation with the Asia Pacific Region including the southern hemisphere nations of Australia and New Zealand. From this grand Eurasian alliance close cooperation will also flourish with Africa and the states of Central and South America.

For Russia Eurasia is a worldview, a new dynamic vision of geopolitics, with unique cultural, political, economic and spiritual dimensions.

As former Foreign Minister of Russia under President Boris Yeltsin once said ' Russia is 'predestined' to be a great power.

What the West often doesn't understand is that Russia's mission in the world today is not to imitate the West but to initiate and support a multicultural dialogue of cultures, civilizations and states.

Saturday, June 27, 2009

COOPERATION NEEDED BETWEEN BUSINESS AND POLITICIANS FOR THE CREATION OF A COMMON ECONOMIC SPACE

While there are a growing number of successful, constructive and mutually beneficial business relations between Russia and the EU, the uncertainties in global financial markets and the recent tensions in the EU-Russia relationship have affected potential investors’ willingness to commit to new projects.

Political leaders on both sides need to reassure the business communities that they are strongly committed to constructive multilateral and bilateral negotiations on strengthening the trade and investment relationship. Political leaders on both sides are called upon to demonstrate the benefits that would be derived from the creation of a Common Economic Space between Russia and the EU and later to even closer integration. Inevitably, the governments on both sides will have a final word in this matter. But the ideas of business can only be fruitful if supported by political consent. Major initiatives in business have to be approved at the highest political level. General modernisation of Russia cannot move independently from government policy, nor can it contradict such a policy. Business people on both sides indicate that they long for an efficient economic partnership between Russia and Europe. The creation of a Common Economic Space would help remove the problems of export imbalances and “energy security”. French President Nicolas Sarkozy came up with the idea of creating such a Common Economic Space between Russia and the EU in order to forge a new relationship with Russia based on trust and tighter integration. “I don't see Russia as a determined rival to the European Union," Sarkozy told the Parliament. "I think, on the contrary, that it is necessary, in the future, to lay the basis of a Common Economic Space between Russia and the EU.” He added that Europe and Russia needed each other, with Russia possessing the energy resources and Europe the technology that Moscow needs. For her part Ferrero Waldner Commissioner for External Relations stressed that economic and trade relations between the EU and Russia were getting stronger, explaining that Russia was the EU's third most important trading partner and growth rates were up to 20% per year. Energy is a major factor, but there is impressive growth in services too, she revealed.

With its recent high growth rates and emerging middle class, Russia is an important emerging market right on EU’s doorstep that offers opportunities, notwithstanding the effects of the present financial crisis, Ferreo-Waldner said. She added that the EU was a major investor in Russia, accounting for 80% of cumulative foreign investment, while a significant share of Russian foreign reserves are in euro, making Russia one of the largest holders of euro-denominated assets in the world.

The EU and Russia should set an example and work together on the creation of such Common Economic Space and the business communities should be invited to participate in these discussions.

REPEATING THE ABDUCTION OF EUROPA

Article written by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's Permanent Representative to NATO

I reproduce the Article of Mr. Dmitry Rogozin that was published in European Voice 'Comment Section' on 25 June 2009 for increasing public awareness about Russia and the EU.

Russia and the EU are two ends of a thread that binds Europe together. They should take steps to defend its perimeters.

The western media often artificially justaxpose Europe and Russia as completely distinct civilisations with manifestly dissimilar values. This results in mutual suspicion and speculation that each pole of the European continent is following a 'special path'. This vision is, at best, a profound delusion and is blind to history.

Russia is and always will be a European nation, representing the eastern vector of Europe's political and cultural development. Since European civilisation split into the Roman and the Byzantine empires, there has been a form of rivalry between Europe's east and west, a rivalry that manifests itself in Russia's relations with the EU and NATO. Nonetheless, Russia and the EU are two ends of a thread that binds together the entire European continent.

Today, the identity of the west is being challenged by colossal cultural and spiritual pressures from the south. Nations conquered in the past are now invading Europe, changing dramatically not only its external but also its inner world. Europe can no longer assimilate huge inflows of alien cultures. Misinterpreting the sage principle of 'tolerance', the west has abandoned the fight to preserve values inherent in European civilisation. Instead of instilling European culture in their new compatriots, the west's elites have concealed the problems in close communities. This cowardly escape from the realities of globalisation will lead to the demise of Europe and its culture.

Western elites have sought to substitute the process of globalisation with plans of salvation for European civilisation. But new projects, such as NATO's enlargement to the east and the Eastern Partnership, pose a greater threat to Europe than if the west took no action at all. The wider that NATO's and the EU's areas of responsibility become, the weaker they become. Taking up the problems and disputes of Europe's eastern half is wearing out its spirit as a civilisation.

Whether Brussels likes or not, Russia is becoming the centre of the European tradition. It is steadily imparting European culture to eastern territories. José Manuel Barroso and Javier Solana who in May visited the grand European city of Khabarovsk in the Russian far east could see for themselves how outdated is Charles de Gaulle's slogan of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals". The Russians have expanded Europe to the shores of Alaska and the Kurile Islands.

Whatever Russia's developmental problems, they are insignificant compared to the threat to the survival of European civilisation. The west may be procuring eastern European countries for itself, but in a genuine cultural and spiritual sense, western Europe is shrinking rather than growing.

Thus, the paradox today is that Europe's western half is shrivelling, while its eastern half is expanding. Russia is now Europe's spiritual guardian, as Byzantinum prolonged the 'cause of Rome' for a millennium after Rome collapsed under the unslaught of the barbarians. The writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky argued that, for Russians, Europe is a 'second fatherland'. Fear of the new Russia is simply unjustified. Russia is the west's most natural and reliable ally: The sooner the west realises that, the greater the chance of speaking of our common European fate not just in the past tense.

It is in Russia-NATO relations that Russia's relations with the west are most strikingly revealed. If we deepen Russia-NATO co-operation, build up trust and crystallise a 'common cause', we can succeed in building a united Europe. Russia does not wish to join NATO. It does not wish to 'dissolve the alliance'. NATO and Russia will maintain different approaches- but we should learn to defend both European approaches. That is best done by concerted action along the perimeters of both Europes. With that goal in mind, Russia is ready to restore relations with the alliance when Russian and NATO foreign ministers meet in Corfu on 27 June.

It is only through understanding Europe's political processes in their historical context that we can forge a true secure future for all countries from the Atlantic to the European city of Khabarovsk.

Friday, June 26, 2009

FLASH BACK

On the occasion of the EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT held in Moscow on 29 May 2000 (9 years ago), a joint statement was issued by both sides including The President of the European Council assisted by the The Secretary General of the Council/The High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, the President of the Commission of the European Communities and the President of the Russian Federation. Basically,

Both the leaders of the European Union and the Russian Federation reaffirmed the importance they attach to the development of their relations in all areas. The partnership and the reinforced political dialogue aimed at promoting a stable and prosperous Europe, based on the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and the market economy.

The Russian side emphasised that developments in Russia supported by the Russian people confirm its European vocation, and that Russia is and will remain a constructive, reliable and responsible partner in working towards a new multipolar system of international relations, based on strict implementation of the international law.

Both sides confirmed the fundamental importance of the PCA and the subsequent Strategies adopted by the Parties for their relations in order to promote a steady and dynamic development in cooperation between Russia and European Union, including in the areas of economy, finance and science and technology. In this context both sides noted some of the highlights of activity now underway, for instance, in the fields of science and technology, in the field of satellite applications for air navigation and radio communication purposes (GLONASS/GALILEO) as well in the domains of nuclear power and safety issues, and transport. Both sides also agreed on the need to cooperate further in developing educational exchanges and training activities.

Both sides set out their priorities in implementing the above-mentioned Strategies. Russia saw these priorities in the areas of ensuring security in Europe, trade, investment, science and technological and cross-border cooperation, collaboration in fighting organised crime and in contacts with the EU in the sphere of its common foreign and security policy.

In their wide-ranging discussions both sides considered ways of giving additional momentum to Russia-EU cooperation with the aim of achieving concrete results. They declared that further steps would be necessary to encourage contacts between their political, parliamentary, business, public and academic circles, between their civil societies and their young people. In this, as well as in the development of regional ties, initiatives in the framework of bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and individual EU Member States would be of great significance.

In the end both sides agreed that their talks in Moscow had shown the great potential for cooperation and that they had made an important step towards effective use of this potential in the long-term interests of the Russian Federation and the European Union, but also in the interests of all peoples of Europe.

The point of this “Flash Back” is to show that both sides had established solid grounds for cooperation nearly 10 years ago.

Since then and taking as an example energy cooperation relations between both sides have been marked by ambiguities. For the EU, energy security means guaranteeing its supplies, so it insists Russia opens its market to EU investors to ensure maximum production and low prices. For Russia, energy security means guaranteeing its exports at the best price. The Russian government does not rule out foreign investment, but considers the energy sector too important to be left to market forces alone. It wants to conserve Russia’s reserves and participate in the whole chain of production and distribution, including distribution in Europe, where the greatest profits are to be made. This has quickly become a political issue. The idea that a country should be able to establish state control over energy has been anathema to the apostles of free enterprise, especially as the idea is likely to catch on.

Pundits in Brussels argue that Russia needs European capital just as much as the EU needs Russian gas. They forget that Russia has no intention of submitting energy to the laws of the market alone and that there is a difference between consumer countries and a producer country courted by a power such as China, which is prepared to pay a high price to secure its energy future.[ Ties between Moscow and Beijing have warmed in recent years after a period during the Cold War when the two giant neighbours were rivals for supremacy in the Communist world. Last year the two countries signed a landmark deal to build a pipeline connecting Siberian oil fields to energy-hungry China . Beijing has been eager to obtain greater access to Russia’s immense energy resources].

In tomorrow’s world dominated by the emergence of China, partnership with Russia could be one of the EU’s best cards.

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

COMBATING RUSSOPHOBIA BY ALL MEANS

Anti-Russian sentiment covers a wide spectrum of prejudices, dislikes or fears of Russia, Russians, or Russian culture, including Russophobia. Today the term “Russophobia” is also used more specifically to describe clichés preserved from the times of the Cold War. Many prejudices often introduced as elements of political war against the Soviet Union, are still observed in the discussions of the relations with Russia—whose leadership are seen as omitting from and manipulating memorialization of its Soviet past. Dislike of Russians is sometimes seen as a backlash of the policy of Russification in the times of Imperial Russia and Soviet Union and backlash against the policies of modern Russian government. However, Russophobia has a long tradition and already existed many centuries before Russia became one of the major powers in Europe.

During the 19th century the competition with Russia for the spheres of influence and colonies was a possible reason for the Russophobia in Great Britain where British propaganda of the time portrayed Russians as uncultivated Asiatic barbarians. These views spread to other parts of the world and are frequently reflected in literature of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The Promotheism political strategy, conceived by Polish chief of state Jozef Pilsudski, had as its aim the weakening of Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union. The Pan-Slavism movement that coincided with the Hungarian uprising of 1848 included anti-Russian sentiment, a reaction to Russia's involvement on the Austrian side of the conflict. This resulted in enmity of Austria-Hungary towards eastern orientation of many of its Slavic constituents in the second half of the 19th century. The elites began to see Russia as a threat and an enemy of Austro-Hungarian multi-ethnic empire. The public opinion became even more radicalized and Russophobic, as the common anti-Russian stereotypes fell onto a fertile ground.

In the 1930s, Adolf Hitler attempted to strengthen the Russophobe stereotypes with his racial theory of subhumans, in part to rationalize and justify the German invasion of The Soviet Union and the atrocities committed against its populace.

Dr. Vlad Sobell of Daiwa Research Institute (a member company of Daiwa Securities Group) claims that what he sees as "Russophobic sentiment" in the West is a result of the West failing to adapt and change its historical attitude towards Russia, even as Russia has in his opinion ditched its ideology and opted for pure pragmatism, successfully driving its economic revival. He further claims that the west remained stuck with its unchanged and unchanging beliefs. He continues, that if anything, the orthodoxy was further entrenched by the West's perception, that, having won the epic fight against totalitarianism, it must forever remain the only game in town.

Some Russian and Western commentators express concern about a far too negative coverage of Russia in Western media (some Russians even describe this as a"war of information"). In April 2007 David Johnson, founder of the Johnson’s Russia List said in an interview to the Moscow News: "I am sympathetic to the view that these days Russia is perhaps getting too dark a portrayal in most Western media. Or at least that critical views need to be supplemented with other kinds of information and analysis. An openness to different views is still warranted."

On the Western side , it would be welcome to see stronger public leadership by Western governing elites, who need to communicate to their public an honest view of realities in Russia – not “the truth about Russia understood as the sum total of negative things that can be said, but something a lot better digested than that. And they need to communicate a considered view to their own media about whether media coverage is really doing the public and the government a service by giving free rein to Russia-bashing, which is often unrestrained by considerations of balance or accuracy. Western governments have an interest in maintaining (or rebuilding) a constructive long-term engagement policy toward Russia.

WE MUST COMBAT RUSSOPHOBIA BY ALL MEANS!!!!

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

ENERGY RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND EU COUNTRIES: NO CAUSE FOR ALARM

The Western press often engages in aggressive reporting on the diverging views between Russia and Russian energy importers. Much of this type of reporting is based on rhetoric and media hype rather than on the reality of relations.

A review of the gas supply history of EU countries will help put things in perspective:

Austria: Austria was the first country in Western Europe to start buying Russian gas in the 1980s and didn’t come to regret it. “Our experience is that Gazprom has supplied Austria and Europe for the last 20 years in a very reliable way,” Wolfgang Ruttenstorfer, Chief Executive of Austrian gas monopolist OMV has recently said. A third of all Russian natural gas exports to Western Europe (50 billion cubic metres) pass through the Baumgarten station in Austria.

Belgium : In mid-2008 Gazprom received permission from the Belgian authorities to supply natural gas to the country's major industrial enterprises. There are also talk for Gazprom to build an underground storage.

Bulgaria: A deal has been signed regarding Bulgaria’s participation in the South Stream project. Bulgaria imports more than 80% of its gas from Russia and is also actively backing the Nabucco pipeline.

Czech Republic: About 80 percent of the fuel comes from Russia. The main transit route delivering gas comes from Ukraine.

Estonia: Gas to Estonia has always been supplied in time.

Finland: Finland is the third least dependent EU country on natural gas. Gas imports come mostly from Russia and Finland is perfectly satisfied with the deliveries and even opted to participate in the Nord Stream project that would bring gas directly to Finland.

France: Russia is France’s second-biggest supplier of crude oil and natural gas and France never had any reasons to complain

Germany: one of the most accurate and collaborating clients of Gazprom, a fellow Nordstream enthusiast and shareholder, Germany holds many of Gazprom's underground gas storages that are instrumental for Europe's energy security.

Greece: Greece has marked its intention to participate in the South Stream project. However Greece is also involved in joint projects with Turkey to diversify its gas supplies.

Hungary : Hungary used to have its own natural gas production in 1960-1970, which peaked in the 80s. Since then domestic demand is satisfied by imports. 60 percent comes from Russia. Hungary supports the Russian pipeline project ‘South Stream’ - already underway - that will deliver gas bypassing Ukraine, and ‘Nabucco’ – a pipeline planned by Caspian gas producers to bypass Russia.

Italy: Relations between Russia and Italy couldn’t be better.

Latvia: Latvia is still fully dependent on Russian gas, and energy security is a vitally important issue.

Lithuania: There have been no significant interruptions of gas supplies to this Baltiс state.

Netherlands: Though a major gas exporter itself, Netherlands now looks forward to increasing the amount of gas it receives from Russia, as its own gas supply will be depleted in 12-17 years. So the Dutch are major Nord Stream enthusiasts and since November 2007 a shareholder of the project as well. Moreover Netherlands agreed with Gazprom on developing a key underground gas storage that will work specifically with NS.

Poland: Almost 50% of Poland's annual gas needs are supplied by Russia. Gas is also being supplied by Belarusian pipelines.

Romania: Romania looks forward to the Nabucco gas pipeline to lessen its dependence on Russian gas.

Slovakia: Almost all of the gas delivered to Slovakia comes from Russia via Ukraine. It’s one of the regions hit most by the disruption of supplies. The country is preparing to restart a nuclear power station that was closed down last year on the request of the EU.

Slovenia : Slovenia is not as dependant on gas as many of its neighbours, as it still utilises power from its nuclear plant in Krško. However, the nuclear plant is due to be shut down in 2023, so Slovenia is in negotiations for the South Stream project.

United Kingdom: In spite of complicated barter schemes to have gas reach the UK, Gazprom has never even considered dropping the United Kingdom as a client.

All in all Russia actually maintains good business relations with the buyers of its energy. These relations do not suffer from major conflict or antagonism; the only pressures they face are those resulting from competition and the market environment. Therefore, at the commercial level, we see that sales of long-term energy contracts are on the rise, joint efforts to build new pipelines are increasing and access to Europe's downstream assets is continuously broadening.

Indeed, the divergence between Russia and its energy importers exists only at the political level. Russia in general and Gazprom in particular are the victims of a number of myths. These myths are aimed at creating a powerful negative image, and turning western public opinion against Gazprom. They include the view that Russia's energy monopoly results in the EU's political dependency on Russia. They also include unfounded accusations that Russia is utilising energy as a weapon against its neighbours.

It should be noted that Gazprom, through projects such as Nordstream, South Stream, and the development of south Russian gas fields and Shtockman offshore fields, is actively working to provide an increased and more reliable gas supply. Of course, Gazprom is a profit-based corporation, and is pursuing its own business interests. These business interests often, but not always, match Russia's national interests. This is much discussed, but what is not acknowledged is that they often also serve Europe's interests. All of Gazprom's activities in the EU have been fully in line with the key interests of its member states, and most are being implemented in coordination with European oil and gas companies on the basis of inter-governmental agreements. The further implementation of Gazprom's projects would benefit the EU by:

• Helping to meet the rising demand for natural gas in Europe;
• Minimising transit risks;
• Strengthening cooperation between the Russian Federation and the EU as well as deepening interdependency (rather than unilateral dependency) between the two parties based on mutual benefits of oil and gas cooperation within the framework of joint ventures;
• Expanding the scope for competition in consumer gas markets;
• Supporting and expediting the process of formation of a unified gas market in the EU.

The increase in Gazprom’s gas deliveries is in no way a threat to the EU’s security The suggestion that Gazprom would invest billions of dollars in expensive gas export pipelines so that it could then disrupt them for political reasons looks absurd, especially in view of the substantial contribution these gas exports make to Russia’s budget and the country’s economy.

If, as it is claimed, Gazprom were trying to pose a threat to the EU, then it is certainly pursuing a very unusual strategy. It spends billions of euros on joint pipelines and gas holders in European countries, exchanges assets with other European energy companies, and places European partners on the executive boards of its offshoot companies. Examining Gazprom's activities, one can hardly say that they pose a threat to the EU. In fact, Paolo Scaroni, chief executive of Italian oil and gas company Eni, described Gazprom as "the pillar of European energy security."

Energy security is increasingly important for both consumer and producer countries. For Europe, Russia is the most important supplier of energy. Equally, Europe is Russia's most important market for its energy products. It is therefore in Europe's economic interests to move beyond political myths and constructed antagonism, and to develop a better mutually beneficial working relationship with Russia in the energy sector.

Gazprom owns 60% of Russia’s proven reserves of natural gas, which themselves make up a third of the planet’s known blue fuel reserves. Gazprom’s business model in export markets like Europe is to provide reliable long-term supplies in stable conditions at predictable prices. The EU depends for 25% of its gas consumption on Russia, yet Gazprom depends on the EU for over 70% of its export earnings. The bottom line is that Gazprom needs Europe as much as Europe needs Russian gas.

Friday, June 19, 2009

RUSSIA: JUST A NORMAL GREAT POWER

Extract from a Paper Published by the Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale (ISPI)
Authors: Serena Giusti and Tomislava Penkova

Russian foreign policy is driven by national interests; pragmatism has replaced ideology. Russia seems to act according to generally predictable and comprehensible rules and principles. Therefore the country should not be seen as an exception but rather as a normal power and – in due course – a normal great power.

In recent years, Russia has developed a more mercantilist rather than imperialist posture towards international politics. However, the West keeps a conservative mindset in dealing with Moscow. In particular, the West tends to look at the way Russia interacts with other major international actors through the lenses of the Cold-War. This way of thinking strengthens old lines of division rather than providing new opportunities of cooperation.

Russia overplaying its energy card has been (mis)interpreted as neo-imperial ambitions rather than a predictable and rational policy meant to establish a more equitable system of international relations.

So if the West considers Russia as an antagonistic power, it will fail not only to build up cooperative relations but also will lose the chance to have Russia on its side in dealing with troubled areas such as the Middle East or Central Asia or with troublesome countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea and Syria. Furthermore, Russia is well poised for facing crucial questions such as terrorism, pollution, high prices of commodities, energy supplies. The West-Russia relationship is definitely not a zero sum game as in the past.

The confusion surrounding the adoption of the Lisbon reform Treaty will not help Russia to understand and deal with the EU. For Russia it is harder to deal/negotiate with the West than vice-versa.

Furthermore, the West tends to look at the way Russia interacts with the major international actors through the lenses of the Cold-War. This way of thinking continues to maintain lines of division rather than offering fresh opportunities of cooperation.

Moscow instead seems more emancipated from the legacy of the past and inspired by pragmatism based on realpolitik. Russia also wants to define its relations with the West
in a completely new atmosphere. It can be argued that the West is still victim of “ideology” and
history while Russia is mostly driven by a realistic approach towards politics.

Cooling relations with the EU depends on the very nature of the process of European
integration more than on increasing competing interests.

. In this perspective, Russia’s alleged “divide et impera” European strategy would simply reflect the idea that in Europe sovereign nation-states still count. It is then easier and more profitable to do business with individual EU member states than with the EU as such. The EU unity is in fact weak, reflecting diverse levels of energy dependency and historical memories and experiences with Russia.

In addition, the EU and Russia interpret history and memory differently. The Russian elite tends to emphasize a prestigious national history rather than reconsider accepted interpretations of the past. In contrast, Europeans give primacy to the devoir de
mémoire on which the whole process of European integration is based (reconciliation).

The EU-Russia relationship also suffers from an excess of institutionalism. Paradoxically, the institutionalization of the relationship has not institutionalized confidence between the partners”

Once again, the EU capacity to build up sophisticated frameworks for dealing with the outside areas/countries might be a way for dissimulating contrasts or not confronting real
issues.

The EU is perceived as highly fragmented, Izvestia (September 1, 2008), for instance, published a map of EU states divided into four categories: “virulent critics”: Baltic states, Britain, Poland, Sweden; “moderate critics”: Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania; “centrists”: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Slovakia; “Moscow lobbyists”: Belgium, Cyprus, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Greece, Italy.

In various and uneven ways the West tried to devise strategies to make integration possible, but always accompanied by conditionality features designed for countries in the process of accession to western institutions, which ultimately proved counterproductive in Russia’s case. The most striking example is the EU-Russia relationship. Brussels seeks to impose certain conditions on Russian political, economic and social development, as it does in the case of EU candidate members.
This tactic however proves to be inadequate for Russia since it cannot be equalled to
such states. Russia has and deserves a different role in world politics. Exerting excessive pressure on its domestic politics results in encouraging anti-Western nationalist forces. The conditionality approach towards Russia means explicitly diminishing its role and force on the international arena and rejecting its contribution and worthiness in shaping the international political landscape. The West should stop being paternalistic towards Moscow and acknowledge its revival. On the contrary, Russia is ready to comply with the rules of those organizations, such as WTO and OECD, where it can enjoy an equal status and the rewards are particularly palatable.

Western analysts persist in viewing Russia and its external choices as highly subjective. Russia is often treated as a special case. We believe that the most suitable way to consider Russia’s foreign policy is rather to recognize it as a “normal” country in the sense that it acts according to generally predictable and comprehensible rules and principles. Further seeing Russia as an exception would be misleading. The West has tended to interpret Russian actions as excessive or arrogant, while they have often been a normal, measured response to the penetration of the US and the EU in regions traditionally considered Russia’s sphere or to hostile decisions .

The West needs to overcome its deeply held suspicions of Moscow and the bitter memories of the past. This does not mean being lenient towards Russia but rather realistic. An erroneous diagnosis leads to a wrong prognosis and finally to a failing strategy. So, if the West continues to see Russia as an antagonistic power it will fail to build up cooperative relations. Not only, the West would gain from having Russia on its side when dealing with troubled areas such as the Middle East or Central Asia or when facing crucial questions such as terrorism, pollution, rising prices, energy supply.

The way Russian behaviour in foreign policy is understood by the other actors is relevant in designing the right strategy to deal with it. If the West still believes that Russia’s main goal is to become an imperialistic power again, then the right policy would be that of containment.

However, the West should keep in mind that Russia’s abandonment of its empire was mainly peaceful and that the desire to maintain a certain influence on its former republics does not necessarily mean a desire to rebuild an empire. Because Russia overplayed its energy card, this was largely misinterpreted as the neo-imperial ambitions of the Kremlin, and not as a natural and logical policy meant to set up an equitable system of international relations. Russia is not a neo-imperial power but a post-imperial country in search of a new international identity.

The risk is also high to apply the same western developed categories in forecasting future Russian moves especially in relation to an alleged more cooperative approach.

Those who apply theories of democratic transition to Russian foreign policy expect that
democratic consolidation, market economy, civil society activation would lead to a more
accommodating posture.

We argue instead that Russian foreign policy is not conceived as a systemic factor for
internal consensus. As mentioned above, Russia could only play again as a great power after re-emerging from the deep crisis of the 90’s. The country’s external dimension did not help cure the internal catastrophe. Assertiveness in foreign policy helps cement national identity and patriotism but is not a reliable means for nourishing internal legitimacy

Contemporary Russian foreign policy has been determined by both history (self-image as a great power) and a sense of frustration the country suffered after the implosion of the Soviet system that was also accompanied by a deep economic slump.

Russia seems willing to become a world model of hyper-modernization, and so a great
power.

Secondly, Russia has developed a global approach towards economics. As E.B. Rumer stresses “Russia is re-emerging on the world economic stage guided by a mercantilist vision founded on its material wealth, a geographic position that gives it control of important trade routes, and the fact that most of its neighbours need the resources Russia either owns or controls”

Russia aspires to shape a grand strategy moving beyond pragmatism and to become a
multi-dimensional global power acting in different geostrategic theatres

The EU seems more focused on certain areas or concerned with specific issues, and is divided over salient issues of foreign policy including common positions towards Russia. This depends on the fact that the EU is not a Super-state but a post-modern entity dominated by nation states and that it has a typically regional vocation.

Russia has the potential to be one of the world’s most powerful economies in the next 7-20 years

Russia’s international behaviour is to a great extent conditioned by its economic interests and rising might.

A re-launch of the currently suspended talks between Moscow and Brussels on a new partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) could be the framework within which to initiate a constructive dialogue over the region.

Overall, it seems that today Russia is well aware of its interests in the post-Soviet space and is seeking to implement a new course towards those states. The Kremlin stresses that it is not a matter of re-establishing the Russian empire, but simply of preserving legitimate strategic interests. “Russia cannot be denied its own political, military and economic interests there, and its policy can be an effort to preserve existing influence in the region for the purpose of its greater stabilization, rather than imperial control”

It is not unusual to hear from Western analysts that, given Moscow’s inability to alter
the political courses embarked on in former Soviet Republics, it is exploiting its growing
economic (energy) power to regain its previous control. Similar statements, however,
do not correspond to the entire truth.

Conclusions and policy recommendations for Russia and the West

• “As with many other nations, ‘the sources of Russian conduct toward the outside world encompass multiple, interconnected continuities and differences, dynamic along with (relatively) static features. Notions of identity, orientation and “destiny” are conditioned by long-term realities such as geographical location, historical insecurities, and strategic culture, but they also evolve (or become “modernized”) in response to changing requirements and conditions, internal as well as external”

• The West needs to come to terms with the fact that Russia has deeply changed. The new resurgent Russia is not planning to be a threat to the West but primarily to improve its domestic situation by assuring economic growth. To become a post-modern great power it is necessary to consolidate as an economic power. In recent years, Russia has developed a more mercantilist rather than imperialist posture towards international politics.

• The West keeps a conservative mindset in dealing with Moscow and tends to interpret its foreign policy through the old Cold-War antagonist scheme. The West is thus conservative and a victim of history. Russia has been forced to look forward and to rebuild its international position almost from scratch.

• As Gvosdev put it, “To get Russia right, we must seek to understand it as it understands itself, not as we might wish it to be”

. Russia should not be seen as a menace that needs to be contained but rather as a partner to be engaged.

• What are the chances of transforming coercive diplomacy into cooperative diplomacy? This primarily depends on the West’s capacity of understanding Russia, whose assertiveness is often misperceived. It is generally considered the fruit of an antagonist and hostile posture while it is rather the outcome of a more solid position conquered from the late 1990s. The first post-Soviet foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, had already announced that Russia was about to turn
into a “normal great power”

• The West should accept the relativism of the concept of democracy. This does not mean being accommodating with all the consequences of the concept of “sovereign democracy” but accepting that democracy consolidation has different timings and patterns of implementation. As Rumer points out, “Perhaps the most important thing for Western policy on Russian domestic affairs is the necessity of taking the long view, of fully internalizing the idea that change in Russia will take generations”

• Russia does not accept any Western intrusion in its domestic politics and condemns the same in its former Republics. To a larger extent sovereignty implies also that Russia wants to be treated as an equal partner and to set a partnership on the Kremlin’s terms. As Trenin explains these terms are: “accept us as we are, without meddling in our internal affairs; treat us as equals; we will do business where our interests meet, but when differences arise, only
compromise solutions are acceptable. We won’t follow your lead”

. This is about using coercive diplomacy for ensuring the “right terms for cooperation”

• The EU seems to overlook Russia’s economic potential and tends to focus on its presumed democratic regression. This approach might be fallacious and risks undermining the EU approach towards Russia.

• Russia does not appear as a declining power enjoying a temporary revival but rather as a rising power trying to consolidate its position by broadening its portfolio of friends, power resources, means of influence.

• Russia’s overplaying its energy card has been misunderstood as neo-imperial ambitions rather than a predictable and rational policy meant to establish a more equitable system of international relations. In some cases what is considered a political blackmail responds instead to an economic logic (raising oil and gas prices to a market level).

As a result, Russia will converge towards the Western system making dialogue easier.

• Nevertheless, the West should be aware of Russia’s tactical use of inclusive multilateralism (the primacy of the UN, democratization of IR, a new just world order).

• Russia has exhibited an innovative and creative foreign policy. Two factors have contributed to it: Russia is less “ideologized” than the West (it does not demand that others be democracies); it can count on oil and gas for increasing its leverage. In this way Russia has reached out to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, all ruled by conservative regimes that the Soviet Union had either ignored or considered as adversaries. This obviously qualifies Russia for US and EU engagement.
• In general, with energy issues dominating Moscow’s international agenda, at a time when resorting to military power can be too costly and unsuccessful, Russia is a palatable partner, equipped with soft means, with whom to share responsibilities in unstable world regions.

Russia, and the EU

• Since the USSR’s disintegration, Russia has not acted like a client state, a reliable ally, or a true friend, but nor has it behaved like an enemy, much less an enemy with imperialistic ambitions led by a hostile ideology.
• Russia is presenting itself as a mediator in world crises. After the end of the ideologization of the IS, Russia can be a mediator of different civilizations and a bridge between the West and the rest of the world. The pro-Kremlin analyst Vladimir Frolov underlines that “A consensus has formed in Russia to the effect that Russia can’t be integrated into Western structures. And there is no opening for us to be integrated into the East. This means that Russia is destined to
remain an independent centre of power, whether or not it wants to. It will have to rely on its own code of civilization, doing its best to establish equally distant or equally close relations with other centres of power”
• The West should watch out for Russia’s ability to fill a vacuum. The EU would also be suited for competing or cooperating with Russia in many strategic areas. This is the reason why once more Russia should be considered as an opportunity rather than a threat. The revival of the Russian backed ‘geopolitical triangle’ of Russia, the EU and the United States might be useful for managing world developments.
• The EU should reconsider its institutionalism while confronting Russia with more realism in terms of objectives, opportunities and means.
• The West needs to be clearer when talking to Russia. To this effect, the EU, in particular, needs to come out with a truly uniform strategy overcoming internal divisions. Russia has difficulty dealing with a fragmented actor such as the EU.

Russia’s preference for bilateralism does not simply respond to a “divide et impera’’ principle but it is also due to the EU’s lack of a common vision in its external relations
. Furthermore, Russia does not trust a post-modern political construction such as the EU, preferring bilateralism in its relations with the EU members.
• Russia is reluctant to comply with EU requests because they are against the country’s strategic interests (refusal to sign the Energy Charter Treaty).

The EU is not in the position to exert conditionality on Russia since membership is not at stake. Because of its energy dependency the EU has not a strong bargaining power. In addition, Russia in the long run is likely to find alternative markets and partners.
• If the EU wants Russia to become a friendly neighbour, it should abandon an “orthodox” approach in favour of a cooperative attitude. As in the past, Brussels should follow a functionalist approach: focusing on low politics specific issues. A holistic approach, demanding that Russia review its domestic orientations while renouncing its global goals, should be avoided.
• The best the EU can do is to favour Russian convergence in many policy area issues. This would de-politicize their tense relations while favouring growing similarities. Legislative approximation can contribute to open up Russia, to improve governance and ultimately to erode statism and all its implications.

We believe that isolating Moscow can be dangerous for the reactions it might produce and because the West needs Russia on many fronts.

Looking at Russia with a Cold-War mindset does not help develop a civil society with
well-informed opinions, on the contrary nationalism might be revitalized. In this sense
too, Europe has proved a weak and divided actor. The pro-Americanism of some EU
member states prevents the EU from playing an independent role in the reshaping of
pan-European security, including smoothing tensions with Moscow. We recommend a
twin-track approach: showing unity when demanding respect for the rules and a skilful
engaging strategy. Europe has no great leverage but it can certainly profit from partnership with Russia.

Thursday, June 18, 2009

ITALY- RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA COULD NOT BE BETTER

Over recent years relations between Italy and the Russian Federation have evolved to a level of absolute excellence, to the point of justly deserving the designation of “privileged relations”.

Italy’s Prime-Minister Silvio Berlusconi is a personal friend of his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and has frequently lobbied on Russia’s behalf in the EU. The convinced and often decisive support with which Italy has encouraged Russia’s integration into the Western community (EU, NATO, WTO and OECD) has been valuable to Russia increasing its foreign policy’s importance and affording Russia a balanced way to address relations with the West and recovering that front line role on the international scene that Russia deserves for obvious historical, geographical, political and economic reasons.

Italy is Russia’s third biggest trading partner. Bilateral trade relations between Russia and Italy peaked at approximately 24 billion euro in 2007, reflecting an increase of 13% over 2006. This has resulted in a contribution to the dynamic expansion of Italian exports (€9.6 billion), which rose 25.4% as compared with 2006 thanks to the gradual improvement of Russian living standards and the consequent increased demand for quality products; the same is true for Italian imports, (€14.4 billion), up by 5.6% in 2007 as a result of Italian increased energy needs. Italy is the second market for Russian gas. 32% of Italy’s gas imports come from Russia and this figure is expected to reach 40% by 2010.

Italian exports to Russia are, for the most part, machinery (32%), textiles products and apparel (16%) and furniture (8%), while a full 71% of its imports from Russia consist of energy products.

As regards Italian investments in Russia, Italy occupies 19th place among foreign investors, with a total of 486 million dollars. But these data are underestimated since many Italian investments in Russia are handled through foreign channels.

Alongside Italy’s solid position in the energy sector, made possible by investments by ENI (long term supply contract with Gazprom until 2035, key partner in Blue Stream II and South Stream Projects) and ENEL, approximately 500 Italian firms are operating in Russia, especially in the sectors of household appliances, ceramics, foodstuffs, apparel, construction, metallurgy and in the sectors of auto manufacturing, petrochemicals, telecommunications—including space telecommunications—and aeronautics (Recently Finmeccanica, the Italian aerospace company, bought a 25 percent stake in the civilian aircraft division of the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi, which is better known for its fighter jets. With Boeing in an advisory role, Sukhoi is now developing a regional passenger jet, the Superjet. Finmeccanica also signed an agreement with the state-owned holding company Russian Technology to develop security systems for guarding airports, oil depots and other large installations).

With the aim of promoting the formation of Italian industrial clusters in Russia, a Joint Working Group was created back in 2003. Within this framework several Russian regions were chosen for the launch of industrial initiatives: Lipetsk, Ekaterinburg, Moscow, St. Petersburg and Perm.

Russian investments in Italy have good prospects for growth, particularly in the oil, metallurgy and steel sectors. In addition to two major Russian investments by Severstal (steelworks) and the steel group Yevrazholding, an agreement was signed in late June 2008 between ERG and Lukoil in the field of oil refining (valued at €1.4 billion).

HOW THE EU SHOULD APPROACH RUSSIA

In my opinion, relations between the EU and Russia need to be handled consultatively, with restraint and sensitivity. The EU must recognize that change in Russia will come from within, and over a long period. To the extent possible, the EU should continue to support processes of enlightenment in Russia – but should not gear policy to unrealistic expectations of the pace of change. It is futile to fulminate that Russia does not meet the benchmarks of Western democracy. The West will have no credibility in Russia unless it practices what it preaches.

The most important form of engagement is the mutually advantageous two-way interaction of business. The further development of the market economy will be the most powerful driver of the modernization of society and governance in Russia.

Last, but by no means least, I believe that the European Union needs to articulate a clear and principled long-term view of its relationship with Russia and make it clear that it :

– recognizes that a strong, stable, prosperous and modern Russia will make a very large contribution to the well-being of the European continent; and seeks to cooperate with Russia to the greatest extent possible.
– fully acknowledges Russia’s right to defend its own interests and pursue its own independent policies within the parameters of international law and of the sovereign rights of other states.
– has an equal interest in the sovereignty, stability and development of the Russian Federation and of all of the other states of the former Soviet Union, and in harmonious relations between them.
– is not seeking to expand its influence at the expense of Russia.

Clearly both sides need to rebuild trust, step by step, by cooperating where they share interests. That will require levels of statesmanship and sobriety in rhetoric and behavior which have recently been conspicuous by their absence; and a realistic perspective on the situation we are in and the problems we face.

FRANCE: A STRATEGIC PARTNER OF RUSSIA

French economic interests in the fields of energy, aeronautics, high technologies, and transport, and, more generally, the potential of the Russian market justify strong a partnership.

France’s trade balance still shows a clear deficit (-€5.4b in 2007), despite a nearly 20% increase in French exports in 2007 (€5.6b, €4.7b in 2006). This growth is explained mainly by the increase in exports of consumer goods (pharmaceutical products and cosmetics), by the growth in automobile sales, and by strong performances in the chemistry sector. France meets growing consumption needs in the areas of luxury goods and household equipment well. However, it has more difficulties meeting the diversification needs of the Russian economy (equipment for hydrocarbon extraction, machine tools, in particular). At the same time, French imports grew nearly 10% compared with 2006 to reach €11b in 2007 (€10b in 2006) because of the increased energy bill (Russia is France’s second-biggest supplier of crude oil and natural gas).

Russia is an expanding market (its trade with the rest of the world grew 29% in 2006) and France doesn’t take advantage of this enough. With 3.9% of the market share in 2007 (4.2% in 2006), France is now Russia’s ninth-biggest supplier, after Germany (which holds 12% of Russia’s market share and which has had a surplus trade balance with this country since 2001), China, the Ukraine, Japan, the United States, Belarus, South Korea and Italy. Moreover, France is only the seventh-leading investor in this country, with about 500 establishments, after Cyprus, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States.

Nevertheless, French trade is currently being rekindled by the completion of a certain number of key projects: Airbus sales, launch of SOYUZ in Kourou, Total’s participation in the exploitation of Shtokman, investments of Alstom, Renault and Peugeot PSA.

In mid-February 2008, Société Générale became the majority shareholder in the Russian bank, Rosbank, Russia’s tenth-biggest bank in terms of assets (€7.6b at the end of 2007), boasting the country’s leading private banking network (600 branches covering 80% of the Russian territory, 3 million private customers and 7,000 big businesses). This transaction, which is the biggest in the history of Russia’s banking sector (USD 1.7b), makes Société Générale the biggest foreign bank in Russia.

In addition, while Russia’s share in the total flow of foreign investments in France remains very low (0.16% in 2006), a certain number of capital-intensive projects became a reality in recent years.

In the luxury goods sector, the Hédiard (gourmet food) trade name was bought out in October 2007 by Luxadvor, owned by Russian businessman Sergei Pugachev, already present in banking, shipbuilding, the hotel industry and real estate through the family conglomerate, OPK.

Aeronautics

EADS/ Airbus: On June 20 2007 at the Bourget trade show, the Russian company, Aeroflot, confirmed its intention to acquire 22 Airbus A350 long range airliners soon, worth approximately four billion euros. In addition, cooperation agreements have been signed by the European aircraft manufacturer and its Russian counterpart, in particular concerning a relative risk partnership on the development of the A350 and the conversion of the A320 into a cargo aircraft.

Safran and Thales: The Russian regional aircraft programme (superjet 100), in which the companies SAFRAN and THALES are participating on the French side, has entered a decisive phase (first flight on 19 May 2008 and first deliveries scheduled for 2008). The potential customers are Russian as well as Italian.

Transportation Infrastructure

In September 2007, ALSTOM won a contract for equipping the rolling stock for the high-speed Helsinki-St Petersburg line and has just negotiated a partnership with the Russian group, Transmashholding, for manufacturing high-speed trains in Russia.

Energy

SHTOKMAN gas deposit: in July 2007, Total has a 25 percent stake in the Shtokman Development Company, the company which is to develop the 3.7 trillion cubic metre field. The rest of the company is controlled by Gazprom (51%) and StatoilHydro (24%). Faced with the need to address huge technological challenges, such as developing floating platforms, for when global warming unleashes huge icebergs, Gazprom badly needs Western expertise to develop the Shtokman field.

· GDF / GAZPROM agreement: Reinforcing a partnership that has been in place since 1975, this long-term agreement, reached in December 2006, calls for deliveries of Russian gas to France to be extended from 2012 to 2030. In accordance with the liberalization process, the Russian company should deliver a portion of the gas directly to the French consumers.
· Alstom / Atomenergomash: a contract signed on 29 June 2007 in Paris is creating a joint company for the manufacture of steam turbines for Russian nuclear power plants.
· Further cooperation between the two countries' electricity giants – Electricité de France and Inter RAO UES, as well as a series of projects in the transport sector.
· French companies Vinci and Bouygues will be building roads in Russie, while there are "big plans" for carmakers Renault and Peugeot in the country.
· Cooperation in the space sector, with French company Arianespace, the world's first commercial space transportation company, to buy ten Russian booster rockets. A launch of a rocket booster is planned for September 2009. Russia and France are looking for long-term cooperation in space with "a lot of French specialists already working in Russia and hundreds of Russian specialists working on French territory.

RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION WITH THE EU

From a Russian point of view, the European debate about energy is all over the place. The Europeans keep demanding that Russia expend huge sums to develop complex new fields. But they struggle to give Russia a clear idea about much gas they will want to buy from it in say 20 years time. They want Russia to allow Western energy companies to invest more in the energy sector. At the same time they are drawing new rules to prevent Russian companies from buying pipelines in the EU. Despite noble words about 'EU Energy Solidarity' companies from individual EU countries are happy to sign long term bilateral supply deals with Russia. Some of these companies have teamed up with Gazprom to build new offshore pipelines that other EU countries perceive as threat to their energy security. And then Russia gets blamed for a strategy of 'divide and rule'.

First Russia's energy policy is much more about seeking profits than about establishing political domination. Russia's interests in energy is overwhelmingly business-related. Russia's business is business. Like Russia, Gazprom wants to make money, be strong, rich and respected. There is no 'geopolitics' per se. Gazprom's moves are often misconstrued as a tool of some political strategy. The reality is different: energy is a political business, but it is business first and last.

What is really bothering is that all offers the EU makes to Russia are not so much models of cooperation as they are mechanisms to neutralize Russia as a risk factor. It is time to abandon the logic that says Russia must prove itself and adopt without question all the conditions dictated to it. There is an urgent need to abandon the logic that treats any behaviour on Russia's part as a threat to the West, as a sign of authoritarianism, of an 'energy war' that the 'Russians are coming' and so on.The starting point for a genuine dialogue must be that each party has its own interests. These interests do not always coincide (between suppliers and consumers). This is natural but that certainly doesn't mean that they are mutually exclusive and insurmountable On the contrary, they are naturally complementary. It is in Russia's interests to co-operate with its main trading partners in the energy and other sectors, and not just for commercial reasons. But the terms must be reciprocal.

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

TAKING RUSSIA AS IT IS

Is cooperation with Russia a means to an end??? What does Europe wants and needs from Russia???

At the outset, there is an interdependency between Europe and Russia. The EU is Russia's third largest trading partner after the U.S. and China. The investment figures are impressive. EU member states account for 80% of foreign investments in Russia and 80 % of Russia's own investment abroad are in EU countries. Energy interdependence continues to be pivotal to economic relations between the EU and Russia. More than 60% of Russia's total oil and gas exports are earmarked for the EU and 25% of EU oil imports and 40% of EU gas imports come from Russia. Russia furnishes 35% of the uranium for the EU nuclear energy production. In 2015 the supply of Russian gas to European customers will reach a minimum of 180 billion cubic meters. The share of Gazprom on the markets of Europe will then be up to 33%.

The EU should work with Russia on a pragmatic basis, taking the country as it is rather than wishing to see it transformed. The future of Russia and Europe are definitely linked. Relations must be built with a long term perspective in mind, based on clear principles and respect for each others' interests. There is no reason for stirring up past phobias.

It serves the relationship no practical purpose to talk constantly about the Kremlin's failure to tackle corruption, modernize its economy, encourage investments and reform its bureaucracy. Today Russia is a market economy and even its state sector is highly commercialized. Russia is no longer the Soviet Union.

It is simply not true that Russia rejects Western liberal values, but it should be understood that a genuine transformation to Western like democracy will take longer than expected. Regardless what may be said, the Russian state has been strengthened, order has been established in the country. The majority of the Russians feel safe, living standards have increased. Private ownership has been legalized for the first time in 100 years. Millions of Russians travel around the world and feel proud again on being Russian.

Although Russia extends to the Pacific Ocean, it has strong cultural, historical and religious links with Europe. Europe shouldn't close doors with Russia but open them. The EU needs to enforce the quality of information brought by the media in order to limit the existence of prejudices and ignorance among Europeans. The political rhetoric stating that Russia uses gas as a 'geopolitical weapon' is very popular in the EU though the facts tell the contrary. European countries are clients of Russia's Gazprom. Many of them have neutral relations with Russia while some have a history of political tensions and even a complete breach of diplomatic ties with Moscow. For certain much work is required to wipe away prejudices and correct false information and this is the reason for starting this blog.

Russia and the EU should seek common grounds. Both sides can benefit from exchanging insight. Russia is changing before our eyes and these changes offer new mechanisms for fruitful interaction with the EU.

For Russia the EU is a difficult and confusing partner to negotiate with. More attention needs to be put on improving communications between Russia and the EU. They are essential in influencing images and attitudes and they also create a basis for political progress.

Finally, Western governing elites need to communicate to their public an honest view of realities in Russia- not 'the truth about Russia' understood as the sum total of negative things that can be said, but something a lot better digested than that. The Russian-bashers may often feel they are serving their countries, since during the Cold War it was true that Soviet-bashing in the media was a form of patriotic flag waving. BUT RUSSIA IS NO LONGER THE ENEMY- IN FACT IT IS MOSTLY A FRIEND- and there are other very real enemies that we could have dealt with better if we had listened to Russia as a friend. This is something the media and others- NGOs, think tanks- have yet to grasp fully. They continue to present a 'patriotic' bias against Russia as the opposite of the patriotic interest of the West.